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grounding mechanism, as predicted by empiricist accounts
only.
In conclusion, although pre-existing circuits might be reused
to provide representational resources for novel functions, we
propose that these resources remain insufficient, and possibly
unspecified, without the involvement of sensorimotor experi-
ence. In order to obtain a more universal theory of neural
reuse, future studies now have to clarify how representational
resources are shaped by cultural and educational constraints
and how they interact with the functions they support.
Neural reuse as a source of developmental
homology
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Abstract: Neural reuse theories should interest developmental
psychologists because these theories can potentially illuminate the
developmental relations among psychological characteristics observed
across the lifespan. Characteristics that develop by exploiting pre-
existing neural circuits can be thought of as developmental
homologues. And, understood in this way, the homology concept that
has proven valuable for evolutionary biologists can be used
productively to study psychological/behavioral development.
Conventional wisdom in the neurosciences has long held that
specific brain regions have specific functions. However, several
recent studies have undermined the claim that cognitive functions
can typically be mapped in straightforward ways to highly special-
ized brain areas, leading Anderson (2007c) to propose his massive
redeployment hypothesis (MRH). In the target article, Anderson
has considered his theory, along with others that posit similarly,
that existing neural structures are normally reused/recycled/
redeployed as new brain functions develop. This new approach
has enormous potential for helping neuroscientists rethink the
relationship between brain structures and their functions, as
well as for helping those interested in the development and/or
evolution of behavioral organization to understand changes in
that organization across ontogeny and phylogeny.
Anderson uses the MRH to predict that a brain area’s phyloge-
netic age should correlate with how often that area is deployed
for various cognitive functions, and that a cognitive function’s
phylogenetic age should correlate with how localized that func-
tion is in the brain. However, although Anderson recognizes
that neural reuse theories bear on questions of development,
his article focuses on phylogeny to the virtual exclusion of onto-
geny. Brief mentions of development are made, and a note points
out that neural reuse “is broadly compatible with the develop-
mental theories of Piaget” (target article, Note 10); but, in fact,
neural reuse should interest all developmental psychologists
because the approach is compatible with most current theories
of development and could contribute to theoretical progress in
the field in general. Anderson cites Dehaene’s “neuronal recy-
cling” theory as having potentially identified a “fundamental
developmental . . . strategy for realizing cognitive functions”
(sect. 1, para. 3); but, like other promissory notes in Anderson’s
text, this one is never fully redeemed. Neither Anderson nor
Dehaene and Cohen (2007) fully consider the implications of
neural reuse theories for understanding development.
The idea of neural reuse could have profound and general
implications for the understanding of behavioral development.
In particular, we believe that neural reuse produces a type of
developmental homology, and that just as evolutionary biology
has profited from the discovery and analysis of evolutionary hom-
ologies (Hall 2003), so developmental psychology may profit from
the identification of developmental homologies, some of which
likely arise as a result of neural reuse. Because two or more
psychological characteristics present at a given point in develop-
ment might both (re)use neural circuits formed much earlier in
development, thinking about such characteristics in terms of
developmental homology could well illuminate their relationship
to each other (as well as to other psychological characteristics
present earlier in development that also depend on these cir-
cuits). Consequently, we believe that importing the concept of
homology into developmental psychology has the potential to
help behavioral scientists understand when, how, and why
specific traits have common developmental origins.
Within biology, several types of homology have been ident-
ified, including among others (1) taxic homology (Griffiths
2007), in which characteristics in different species (e.g., bat
wings and human forearms) have derived from a characteristic
present in a common ancestor; (2) serial homology (Rutishauser
& Moline 2005), in which parts of an individual organism are of
the same type (e.g., the corresponding bones in a person’s right
hand and right foot, or any two vertebrae in mammalian spinal
columns); and (3) ontogenetic homology (Hoßfeld & Olsson
2005), in which distinct individuals of the same species have dif-
fering features that nonetheless derive from common embryonic
tissues (e.g., human ovaries and testes). Developmental hom-
ologies arising from neural reuse would be most similar to the
kinds of homologies identified by Bertalanffy in 1934 (described
in Hoßfeld & Olsson 2005), and would include pairs of psycho-
logical characteristics, both of which emerged from a common
characteristic present earlier in development. In addition,
much as human forearms are homologous to the forearms of
extinct Australopithecines, psychological characteristics of
adults could be recognized as homologues of psychological
characteristics present in juveniles in various developmental
stages. Such homologues could arise in ways that would not
require neural reuse – after all, “a structure that is homologous
across species can develop based on non-homologous genes
and/or developmental processes, and vice-versa” (Brigandt &
Griffiths 2007, p. 634) – but any characteristics known to
emerge following the redeployment of a specific neural circuit
would seem prima facie to be homologous, at least structurally
if not functionally.
Several examples of possible developmental homologies may
be identified. Temporal cognition in the form of episodic think-
ing develops later than spatial cognition and makes use of
related conceptual structures (Clayton & Russell 2009). The dis-
covery that these mental processes also make use of certain
shared neural circuits would indicate that they are homologous,
thereby shedding light on the nature of their developmental
relationship. Linguistic structures, likewise, may well depend
upon earlier-developing social interactive communicative struc-
tures. Tomasello (2003), for example, argues that syntax can be
understood as a form of joint attention, a conceptualization that
implies that these are homologous psychological characteristics,
their different appearances notwithstanding. Still other psycho-
logical characteristics that appear similar across age have been
assumed to be homologues, such as the neonatal imitation
reported by Meltzoff and Moore (1977) and later-developing
forms of imitation observed in older children and adults. Even
so, studies of the neural circuits that contribute to neonatal and
later imitation might or might not support this conclusion; a
finding that adult imitation normally recruits neural circuits pre-
viously used during neonatal imitation would certainly qualify as
support for the contention that these behaviors are homologous.
As Anderson suggests, neural reuse might be a fundamental
organizational principle of the brain; and just as this idea can
be used to formulate testable hypotheses about the evolution of
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both the brain and its function, we think it could also influence
the study of psychological development in significant ways. Simi-
larly, importing the idea of homology from evolutionary biology
into developmental psychology could help researchers conceptu-
alize behavioral development in new and potentially informative
ways. Taken together, the concepts of neural reuse and develop-
mental homology could be used to further our understanding of
brain development, psychological development, and the relation-
ships between these phenomena.
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Abstract: The growing recognition by cognitive neuroscientists that areas
of vertebrate brains may be reused for multiple purposes either
functionally during development or during evolution echoes a similar
realization made by neuroscientists working on invertebrates. Because
of these animals’ relatively more accessible nervous systems, neuronal
reuse can be examined at the level of individual identified neurons and
fully characterized neural circuits.
The principle of neural reuse is widespread within peripheral
sensory and motor circuits in both vertebrates and invertebrates.
Peripheral sensory circuits, such as those in the retina, extract
and process information that is used in many behaviors.
Indeed, the coding of visual scenes or odors requires that over-
lapping sets of sensory neurons are activated in response to
different scenes or odors. Likewise, overlapping sets of premotor
and motor neurons may be activated in disparate behaviors that
require activation of overlapping sets of muscles.
The detailed characterization of invertebrate neurons and
neural circuits has demonstrated that neurons can be reused to
form neural circuits that perform multiple functions. One strik-
ing example comes from the stomatogastric ganglion (STG) of
the crab Cancer borealis. The 30 neurons of the STG control
rhythmic muscle activity involved in chewing and digestion of
food – the gastric mill and pyloric rhythms, respectively. Individ-
ual identified neurons may contribute to the production of more
than one rhythm. The VD neuron, for example, is involved in the
generation of both the gastric mill and pyloric rhythms
(Weimann & Marder 1994). Thus, the dynamic restructuring of
neural circuits within the STG provides a clear example of the
reuse of neurons for the production of different behaviors.
Reuse may also be found in neurons involved in learning and
memory. In the pond snail (Lymnea stagnalis), the breathing
rhythm is generated by three synaptically connected neurons
that form a central pattern generator. One of these neurons,
RPeD1, is also necessary for many aspects of learning and
memory; and removing the RPeD1 cell body can prevent the for-
mation or reconsolidation of long-term memories (Sangha et al.
2003). In honeybees (Apis mellifera), a single identified neuron
(VUMmx1) in the suboesophageal ganglion mediates the reward
pathway in associative olfactory learning, but this neuron has
also been implicated in learning phenomena as diverse as
second-order conditioning and blocking (Menzel 2009).
The above examples emphasize that within the adult nervous
system neurons are reused for different functions; but as Ander-
son points out, neurons may also be reused during development.
One such example is the reuse of larval motor neurons in the
adult nervous system of the tobacco hornworm moth (Manduca
sexta). Manduca caterpillars, like those of all moths and butter-
flies, undergo a metamorphosis that involves restructuring of
the nervous system. Motor neurons that innervate leg muscles
in the caterpillar have been shown to remodel their axons and
dendrites during metamorphosis before innervating newly devel-
oped leg muscles (Kent & Levine 1993). Memories can also be
retained between larval and adult forms of insects, despite the
remodeling of neural networks during metamorphosis. For
example, adult fruit flies (Drosophila melanogaster) retain mem-
ories of odors associated with aversive stimuli formed as third
instar larvae (Tully et al. 1994). Memory retention between
developmental stages suggests that those elements of neural cir-
cuits that are the loci of these stored memories are reused in
adult animals.
Anderson also suggests that neurons may be reused during
evolution, acquiring novel functions and possibly losing their
original function. Again, invertebrate neural networks provide
examples of such reuse during evolution. In the desert locust
(Schistocerca gregaria), more than 20 interneurons have been
identified from the neural networks controlling the flight
muscles. Some of these interneurons have homologues in
abdominal neuromeres, which innervate segments that do not
bare wings or contain motor neurons innervating flight muscles
(Robertson et al. 1982). Yet, these interneurons can reset the
flight rhythm in the locust, showing that despite their location
they are components of the flight control machinery. Indeed,
their role in the flight control circuitry may have influenced the
structure of the insect ventral nerve cord (Niven et al. 2006).
Robertson et al. (1982) have suggested that these interneurons
are remnants of control circuits for ancestral appendages that
have been lost.
Neural reuse may be more prevalent in invertebrate brains,
especially those of insects, which contain relatively few neurons
compared to those of many mammals. Many insects possess
small brains that have been miniaturized during evolution
(Beuthel et al. 2005). Their small size means that insects are
under selective pressure to reduce energetic costs and brain
size (Chittka & Niven 2009). Anderson suggests that energy mini-
mization in the absence of behavioral constraints would promote
the reduction of neural structures and, thereby, the reuse of
neural substrates. The possibility of reusing neurons for different
behaviors through the dynamic restructuring of neural circuits
means that the consequences of miniaturization may not be as
severe as is often assumed.
Anatomical modularity is clear within invertebrate nervous
systems (e.g., Niven et al. 2006) but, as Anderson mentions,
neural reuse may blur the boundaries between anatomical
modules. Indeed, most behaviors involve sensory and motor cir-
cuits that are overlapping anatomically, and it seems unlikely that
the majority of behaviors are localized entirely within specific
anatomical modules. As discussed above, the locust neurons
involved in wing control, which include examples of evolutionary
reuse, are spread across six neuromeres although only two seg-
ments bear wings (Robertson et al. 1982). Indeed, even reflex
arcs confined to a single neuromere can be modified by descend-
ing and local control, allowing the neurons to be reused in differ-
ent behaviors (Burrows 1996). Anatomical modularity has been
suggested to reduce the energy consumption of neural proces-
sing by reducing the length of relatively common local connec-
tions and increasing the length of relatively rare long-distance
connections. Thus, although modularity may be beneficial for
efficiency, it may be opposed by neural reuse, which may not
minimize the lengths of connections within neural circuits. In
small brains, the low number of neurons and the short distances
of most connections may promote further functional reuse, even
when some components of neural circuits are in different ana-
tomical segments. Thus, in small brains there may be an
increased prevalence of neural reuse.
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